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1.
In a recent paper, Charles Taylor has argued to recognise the “understanding of the other” as a
pressing and challenging problem for human sciences today2). We can understand Taylor’s claim as a
reaction to the accelerating experience of plurality of world- and life-orientations going along with the
processes of globalisation; albeit this experience is also characteristic for modernity, a subject matter
to which Taylor has devoted much of his scholarship3).
For those being familiar with Taylor’s work, it will not be surprising that, in his paper, he
stresses the significance Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics has for coming to grips with this prob-
lem. It is well known that Taylor always has shown great sympathy for hermeneutical philosophy4)
but, at least to my knowledge, he never before has so clearly expressed his indebtedness to Gadamer,
especially regarding the concepts of “dialogue” and “fusion of horizons.”
While employing Gadamer’s hermeneutics for conceptualising the “understanding of the other,”
for Taylor is nothing else but a natural extension of his work, it raises serious reservations in other
quarters. Since the 1980s, a lot of criticism has been brought up against Gadamer’s hermeneutics,
doubting its usefulness for making sense of the other, that is the culturally alien. Because the herme-
neutics of effective-history, so the argument goes, aims at the reaffirmation of one’s own cultural tra-
dition, it must fail in doing justice to those others who belong to a different, if not a none Western
culture. Based on this criticism, it has become fashionable, at least in the German-speaking world, to
pit a so-called “intercultural hermeneutics” against Gadamer5).
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However, on closer inspection, it becomes evident that the differences between the two are far
from being that decisive as Gadamer’s critics claim them to be. In fact, as Axel Horstmann has
pointed out, intercultural hermeneutics makes ample use of concepts central to Gadamer’s hermeneu-
tics, particularly the concept of dialogue, so that, according to Horstmann, in the whole discussion, no
new theoretical insights have been generated6).
And yet, there are, as I believe, good reasons for challenging Gadamer on this plane, precisely in
order to enrich our understanding of hermeneutic philosophy. It is not my intention to make another
attempt at doing away with the hermeneutics of effective history; I rather wish to excavate some of its
presuppositions that have been (most likely unconsciously) covered up by Gadamer as well as by his
interprets like Taylor. Thus, we will also be able to better assess the significance Gadamer’s herme-
neutics has for the problem of understanding the other. For this purpose, I will inquire into a notion of
Gadamer that is seldom discussed, that of hermeneutical “in-between,” and hopefully will, thus, be
able to contribute to the task of hermeneutics, which is, according to Gadamer, “to clarify the condi-
tions in which understanding takes places”7).
2.
In Truth and Method, Gadamer determines the “in-between” as “the true home of hermeneu-
tics.”8) Hermeneutics takes its position between “strangeness and familiarity that a transmitted text has
for us [. . .] between being an historically intended separate object and being part of a tradition.”9) As
the context of the passage reveals, this is meant as a criticism against the romantic hermeneutics and
historicism. Therefore, when speaking of “in-between,” Gadamer is far more concerned with distin-
guishing his own approach from the methodological operations of historicism resulting in objectifying
one’s own tradition, than keeping distance from the all-too-familiar understanding of ones allegedly
unbroken stream of tradition. In other words, Gadamer’s rendering of the “in-between” is determined
by his own hermeneutical situation, as is his response to this situation, that is to defend against the
methodological consciousness in historical sciences the ontological turn in the meaning of understand-
ing that Heidegger had brought about.
From this situation follows that Gadamer determines understanding as essentially motivated by
the “temporal distance,” the hermeneutical significance of which “has remained entirely peripheral in
previous hermeneutics”10). What is meant here, is the distance between the understanding present (ver-
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stehende Gegenwart) and the past that has to be understood (zu verstehende Vergangenheit), both be-
longing to the same tradition that has been handed down by effective-history. Being “a positive and
productive possibility of understanding,” the temporal distance is an indispensable condition for the
beginning of all understanding, that is “when something addresses us.”11) Only when we are addressed
by something in our own tradition, we experience the tension between strangeness and familiarity, as
which the “in-between” emerges. Something of the handed-down past becomes questionable, and it is
our responsibility to articulate an answer, that is to respond by examining our prejudices (whether they
can stand the test of tradition) and, thus, giving an interpretation of the truth of the questionable thing
(Sache). This is, when the “fusion of horizons” takes place, that is, when a present interpretation is
mediated with the truth of its tradition and, thus, the unity of both is affirmed.
It lies in the very nature of any response of this kind, that it conceals aspects of the interpreted
thing that seemingly bear no immediate significance for the response itself. This is the case with
Gadamer, too. His hermeneutics of effective-history is in itself an event within the effective-history of
hermeneutics. Every critic who blames Gadamer’s hermeneutics for being of no use for intercultural
understanding should bear this in mind. For our purpose it is important that Gadamer himself has no-
ticed the limitations of his notion of “temporal distance.” In a footnote that has been inserted in the
Gesammelte Werke he admits that “it is distance－not only temporal distance” that helps us to distin-
guish the true from the false prejudices12). What Gadamer has in mind here, is the dialogical relation
between I and Thou, where our prejudices are put to the test13). The distance between I and Thou goes
indeed beyond the scope of effective history, and yet, this self-correction is not sufficient to prove the
significance Gadamer’s hermeneutics might have for understanding the other. As we will see below,
the notion of dialogical in-between, when applied to the hermeneutical situation that is constitutive for
philosophers in modern Japan, makes necessary certain modifications of the concept of horizon that
conflict with a notion of understanding Gadamer never abandoned, that is, as something that is sub-
merged in the truth of the thing it has to understand14). Hence, we are in need of a description of the
“in-between” that explores in greater detail the relation between horizon and understanding.
3.
Admittedly, it was not while reading Gadamer, that my attention was drawn to the problematic
aspects of the concept of “in-between,” but while examining the hermeneutical situation of modern
Japanese philosophy, exemplified by one particular philosopher, Watsuji Tetsurô, who, through a criti-
cal appropriation of Heidegger’s Being and Time, developed an alternative concept of in-between.
Watsuji came across this book during his sojourn in Berlin, in 1927, and it motivated him, as he him-
self witnesses, to an in-depth inquiry into Ethics as a Study of Man, so the title of a book of Watsuji,
published in 193415).
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For the purpose of this paper, I refrain from giving a detailed account of Watsuji’s ethical-
anthropological thought; I rather will draw our attention directly to the notion of in-between/between-
ness, aida/aidagara, which is, according to Watsuji, the fundamental structure of human existence,
ningen sonzai. Watsuji arrives at this notion by following a quite peculiar path, as we will see below.
At the time he went to Berlin, Watsuji was already recognised as a distinguished scholar in the
field of intellectual history of Buddhism. However, he become aware of the philosophical significance
of Buddhist thought only after he had encountered Being and Time. He obviously had great expecta-
tions that Heidegger’s analytics of being-in-the-world would help him to find a philosophical answer
to a question that might be described as the driving force behind his thought in general and which he
had posed already in 1913: “How is an authentic life in modern times possible?”16).
This question was, of course, motivated not so much by Watsuji’s studies in Buddhism but by the
specific historical situation of Japan at that time. Only half a century had passed, since the country had
been forced to open itself towards the rest of the world, especially to Western countries, and was, to
use Harry Harootunian’s pithy phrase, “overcome by modernity”17). The problem, how to cope with
modern Western concepts like individualism, freedom, society, democracy, etc. was hotly debated
among Japanese intellectuals; Watsuji too got involved in these debates, even though his philosophical
approach to this problem stands out.
Albeit Watsuji draws on the works of Husserl, Scheler, Kant, Hegel, and many other Western
philosophers, for him, Heidegger is the pre-eminent point of reference. This is evidenced by the key
function, Heideggerian terms have in his discourse: Temporality, spatiality, authenticity, and, most of
all, understanding, which he, following Heidegger, interprets not as a means of method, but ontologi-
cally. As a fundamental aspect of human existence, understanding means to disclose possibilities of
being. However, Watsuji’s project of an Ethics as a science of man determines how he conceives
these terms, in particular the concept of understanding. Albeit the question of how an authentic life in
modern times is possible resonates with Heidegger, at least at an ontic level, Watsuji’s solution points
to a completely different direction. He pays no heed to the significance the fundamental ontology has
for Heidegger’s analytics of being in the world and the concept of understanding. (Therefore, many of
his, albeit productive, misunderstandings arise.) Hence, unlike Heidegger, he is not interested in re-
vealing the supreme possibility of understanding as “anticipatory resoluteness” in the experience of
“Being-towards-death.” He rather aims at giving a description of how understanding establishes the
“practical interconnectedness” of “I and Thou”18).
One major result of Watsuji’s discourse is his conceptualisation of human existence as ningen,
which can be rendered in English as “man-in-between.” The term was coined in the third century,
when the Buddhist scriptures were translated into Chinese. Originally, ningen means “world of human
beings” in contrast to the other four worlds of Buddhist cosmology. The grapheme gen/aida reads
loka in Sanskrit, meaning “open space” or “clearing,” while the first part of the term, nin/hito, refers
to the human being. In Watsuji’s time, its meaning had significantly changed. Now, ningen was used
in everyday language to designate the individual human being, while, at the same time, it was used in
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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academic circles as a term for translating Western philosophical concepts like anthropos, homo, man,
and Mensch. According to Watsuji, these definitions are concealing ningen’s ontological structure of
aidagara, which means that “ningen is the world (yo no naka) and, at the same time, man in the
world”19).
The ethical significance of this structure is spelled out as mediation between the particular indi-
vidual and the totality of the ethos. (In this respect, Watsuji very much resembles Aristotle and Hegel.)
According to Watsuji, individual and ethos are forming a relation of dual negation20). For our purpose
it is important to note that, ontologically speaking, “individual persons do not subsist in themselves [. .
.] The whole [i.e. the ethos] also cannot subsist in itself”21). Neither the individual nor the ethos “has
‘precedence’.”22) If we follow Watsuji, to exist in aidagara means that man cannot but exist in relation
with others and, at the same time, inasmuch an individual, constitute these relations. In other words,
the individual is not only depending on others but also has, within limits, the capability to “shape
freely” the ethos it belongs to23). In other words, the in-between can be conceived as the locus where
both individual and ethos are mediated with one another.
Obviously, Watsuji was attracted by Heidegger’s emphasis on the finitude of human existence.
However, he articulated it in terms of the relation between I and Thou, which has, according to him,
first and foremost, a spatial character. This is meant when he claims that human existence had to be
understood “not only as zeitlich but also as ortlich”24). Drawing on the original buddhist meaning of
ningen and by analysing phenomena like transportation and communication, which make possible
common practices and understanding, he determines the interconnectedness spatially as “subjective
spread between the self and the other.”25) That is to say, with the term “spatial,” we are not referring
to an objective space as in natural sciences. Human existence is “spatial” inasmuch it cannot but exist
in relation with others, that is as aidagara. It is this betweenness, that comprehends all possibilities of
understanding.
This is not the place to judge the accuracy of Watsuji’s reading, the appropriateness of his criti-
cism, or the persuasiveness of his ethical discourse. I will rather inquire into the bearing, his notion of
in-between, aidagara, has to the problem of how he was able to carry out his interpretation of human
existence as ningen in the first place.
4.
The in-between between Heidegger’s Dasein and the Buddhist notion of ningen can not be com-
prehended as a distance that could be bridged in a comparison, as if Watsuji had held Being and Time
and the Buddhist scriptures against each other and then decided what to pick from which. Also, Wat-
suji did not take, first, a firm foothold in his own tradition and, then, attack Heidegger. Besides, rely-
ing solely on his own tradition, he would have lacked the conceptual means to challenge Heidegger on
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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his own grounds. In these two examples, the in-between is conceived of as space that lies between two
disconnected entities. The true meaning of in-between emerges when we take into account its dynamic
aspect, which is similar to the aspect of interpretation in Watsuji’s notion of ethical aidagara. Albeit,
this brings us closer to the meaning of “in-between” in Truth and Method, it remains questionable
whether we can grasp his interpretation in terms of “fusion of horizons.”
First, we have to look into the relation of understanding and tradition in Watsuji’s hermeneutical
situation. Again, the contrast with Gadamer is helpful. It is clear that Watsuji’s tradition is not to be
conceived as “substance” that “both prescribes and limits every possibility of understanding any tradi-
tion”26), because, for him, the understanding of his tradition is, in at least one important aspect, made
possible not by the tradition, but by something from outside. Because Watsuji integrated Heidegger’s
notions of understanding, being-in-the-world, etc. into his own horizon, he was able to interpret ningen
as outlined above.
If we take into account that, in Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons,” the act of interpretation is sub-
merged in the tradition that has to be understood, we hesitate to call the integration of Heideggerian
concepts into the horizon of Watsuji’s tradition a fusion. According to Gadamer, the mediation of in-
terpretation and tradition is of such completeness that the interpretation is no longer identifiable as
such; in order to let emerge in full the truth of the tradition, the interpretation has, if we are allowed
to borrow Watsuji’s words, to negate itself completely. And yet, the concept of negation in Watsuji
differs in one crucial point, as it does not presuppose a substantial totality (see above). Hence, the act
of interpretation has a quite different function from that one it has in Gadamer. It is not meant to af-
firm a substantial tradition but rather to bring about a radically new interpretation of it. A brief reflec-
tion on Watsuji’s rendering of the Japanese poetry form of renga (linked poem) will show better what
is involved here.
In the composition of a renga, many poets are involved. As Watsuji says, every poet creates a
poem that “is forming a world on its own” and, at the same time, has to be in accordance with the po-
ems created by the other poets: “Each verse in a linked poem has its own independent existence, yet
there is a subtle link that unites these so that one existence evolves into another and there is an order
that reaches through the whole. As these developmental links between verse and verse are usually
forged by different poets, the coordination of the imaginative power of a single poet is deliberately
cast aside and the direction of the development given over to chance. Thus, the composition of the
whole is the product of chance; yet, because of this, it becomes all the richer, with the kind of twist
and turn that could not be expected of a single author.”27)
After the explanations given above, the passage is not difficult to understand. It exemplifies the
mediation of particular and totality in an in-between. Here, the particular, that is the individual poem,
is not submerged in the totality, that is the complete renga-poem. Albeit limited by the other poems,
every individual poem is still recognisable as such; it does not disappear behind the totality of the
renga. Thus, the complete renga-poem is nothing substantial like the work of arts, Gadamer discusses
in Truth and Method, but rather something that comes into being only through the collaboration of a
plurality of poems, which, at the same time, are brought into full play by their totality. The distance
that allows for distinguishing each individual poem from the others and from the totality is nothing
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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else than an in-between.
This structure of complementary mediation can be applied to Watsuji’s hermeneutical situation.
Similar to the renga-poem, Watsuji’s notion of ningen has multiple authors. First of all, it is a result
of a “collaboration” of Heidegger’s analytics of Being-in-the-world and Buddhist cosmology. Wat-
suji’s part in that collaboration could be understood as that of a midwife who helped giving birth to a
new interpretation of ningen in that he asked the right questions at the right time. And yet, his herme-
neutical situation is more complex than the structure of the renga-example, because, in a renga, the
focus is not on how the links between the individual poems affect each other, but on their relation to
the totality, whereas, for Watsuji, the horizon of his own tradition not only contributes to the emer-
gence of something new, but is shaped through the encounter with Heidegger in the first place. This is
not to say that there would not have been such a horizon before 1927; this would be nonsense. But it
is to say that the encounter with Heidegger has revealed possibilities lying hidden in Watsuji’s tradi-
tion that otherwise would have stayed in concealment and, thus, could not have been able to contrib-
ute to the emergence of the notion of human existence as aidagara at all.
Of importance is, furthermore, the notion of “chance,” that is contingency. It gives us a hint to
the fact that situations like the session of renga-poets or Watsuji’s encounter with Heidegger are not
entirely at the participants’ disposal. Their in-between emerges in a discontinuous moment. We can
call this, following Walter Benjamin, a “constellation.”28) In a constellation, the continuous stream of
history is interrupted. The historian (for Benjamin, the historian who is trained in dialectical material-
ism) breaks out of it a single moment or aspect that fits the requirements of his time, that is, he estab-
lishes a simultaneous relation between past and present. The example of the French revolution given
by Benjamin can be put into parallel with Watsuji’s situation. Remember his question for the possibili-
ties of an authentic life in modernity; it could only arise in a concrete historical situation, that is in the
encounter with Western modernity. As the French revolutionaries understood their situation in terms of
a new Rome29), for Watsuji and his contemporaries a vast array of possibilities of how to make sense
of their situation was at hand, ready to be broken out of the stream of history.
And yet, it can be doubted whether the understanding Watsuji and his compatriots arrived at can
be called “historical.” The presuppositions that would allow us to do so, are far too challenging to be
fulfilled. As we have seen, the concept of effective-history cannot be applied to Watsuji’s hermeneuti-
cal situation. The same applies to Benjamin’s philosophy of history－illuminating as his concept of
constellation may be. Albeit constellations and their interpretations are discontinuous events, we have
to presuppose the continuous stream of history out of which single moments can be broken out. But
what kind of concept of history could be applied to a situation that comprises Heidegger, Buddhist
thought, and Japanese modernity? Even if we follow Gadamer and renounce the claim of historicism
to gain full understanding of history, that is, if we admit that only limited understanding is true under-
standing, we would find it difficult to establish any historical continuity between these three poles. I
leave it open for discussion, whether it makes sense to speak here of “spatiality of understanding.”
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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5.
We can now return to the question of the significance Gadamer’s hermeneutics has for under-
standing the other. Throughout the argument, it should have become obvious that Gadamer helps tre-
mendously, first, in conceptualising the problem; without the hermeneutics of effective-history it
would have been far more difficult, if not impossible, to reveal the possibilities lying hidden in Wat-
suji’s notion of aida/aidagara. Second, the fact that Gadamer applied Heidegger’s concept of existen-
tial understanding to the problem of historical understanding can hardly be overestimated, for it is in-
dispensable to come to grips with so-called intercultural constellations.
It is precisely this aspect, Charles Taylor drew on for his appropriation of Gadamer’s hermeneu-
tics. Taylor makes an important point when he defends the idea of “coming to an understanding with
an interlocutor” against all attempts to reduce understanding to a method for “knowing an object.”30)
However, we must not forget that Gadamer’s solutions to the problem of understanding cannot be
applied to the problem of understanding the other without some significant modifications. First of all,
the concept of horizon has to be expanded; defining it as “substance” is only one possibility in very
specific cases that, moreover, require specific presuppositions, most of all the continuity of effective-
history. This leads to the second point, Gadamer’s emphasis on continuity. It leaves us clueless when
we are to make sense of hermeneutical constellations like in Benjamin or Watsuji. Third, the notion of
in-between needs greater specification in order to accommodate, for instance, Watsuji’s concept of
aida/aidagara. Fourth, the concept of understanding itself. As shown, submerging the act of interpre-
tation in the substance of what has to be understood fails to make sense of hermeneutic situations like
that of Watsuji’s.
Most remarkably, even when carrying out these modifications, we cannot do away with Gadamer,
as it his him who still helps us asking the right questions. We should not blame Gadamer, if we aren’t
asking them at the right time.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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Horizons and In-Betweens:
On the Interpretation of Western Philosophy in Japan and its Hermeneutical Situation
ABSTRACT
In the West, philosophy in Japan is chronically understudied. This is partly under-
standable, but, in particular for hermeneutical philosophy, unfortunate. This paper ar-
gues that a careful inquiry into the hermeneutical situation in which philosophy in
modern Japan developed, could enrich our understanding of hermeneutical philosophy
as such. It claims that, for an adequate description of this hermeneutical situation, more
refined conceptual means are required than current hermeneutics (especially the herme-
neutics of effective-history) can provide. In particular, Gadamer’s concepts of horizon
and hermeneutical in-between ought to be reconsidered. For this purpose, this paper
engages in a dialogue between Gadamer and Watsuji Tetsurô (1889−1960) whose no-
tions of aida (in-between) and aidagara (betweenness) could serve as a remedy for
some of the shortcomings inherent in the hermeneutics of effective-history.
Key Words: hermeneutics, in-between, Charles Taylor, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Watsuji
Tetsurô, Walter Benjamin
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